Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright Cases by Volokh, Eugene & McDonnell, Brett
Essay
Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment
Review in Copyright Cases
Eugene Volokh* and Brett McDonnell"t
Copyright law restricts speech. It restricts what writers may write, what
painters may paint, what musicians may compose. It prohibits not only slavish
copying, but also creation of entirely new works, so long as those works
use--even if only in part-another's expression.' Of course, the Supreme
Court has held that copyright law is a valid speech restriction.2 Because the
law stimulates entry into the marketplace of ideas, and because the law
prohibits only the use of others' expression, not their ideas or the facts they've
uncovered, the Copyright Act3 doesn't violate the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, as the Court has time and again held, certain procedural
safeguards must accompany even substantively valid speech restrictions. One
such safeguard is independent judicial review, by appellate courts when
reviewing a verdict and by trial courts on motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or for summary judgment. Under Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,' appellate courts may not just turn
over vague phrases such as "actual malice," "incitement," or "expression, as
opposed to idea" to factfinders, and then defer to the factfinders' conclusions
t Acting Professor, UCLA Law School (volokh@law.ucla.edu). Many thanks to Jane Ginsburg, Zoe
Hilden, Lionel Sobel, and John Wiley for their help. and to the John M. Olin Foundation for its extremely
generous research assistance; thanks also to the lawyers surveyed infra Subsection 11.8.2 for their time and
their insights.
"t Law Clerk to Judge Alex Kozinski, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1. Note that we speak here of copyright claims based on matenal that is "expression" for free speech
purposes-books, movies, songs, paintings, and so on. Our argument doesn't cover copynghted software.
which (at least in object code) generally doesn't qualify as speech for First Amendment purposes. Cf. Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (stating that. to be protected under the Free Speech Clause, activity
must be "'sufficiently imbued with elements of communication' (quoting Spence v. Washington. 418 U.S
405, 409 (1974))).
2. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers. Inc. v. Nation Enters.. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
4. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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about what constitutes libel, incitement, or copyright infringement. Instead,
courts must "conduct[] an independent review of the record both to be sure
that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category and
to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow
limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited."5
Lower courts have properly accepted this principle for trial court review on
motions for summary judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.6
In theory-a theory the Supreme Court has accepted as a principle of
constitutional law-such independent review prevents prejudiced or erroneous
deprivation of constitutional rights by factfinders.7 If a factfinder erroneously
concludes that your book infringes someone else's book, the factfinder hasn't
just made a legal mistake: It has made a mistake of constitutional magnitude,
and has deprived you of your First Amendment right to write your own
expression, even when based on another's idea. Courts must, Bose holds,
protect against such mistakes by policing factfinders' decisions.
Beyond this, independent review is also supposed to help prevent future
mistakes by making the lines in free speech law clearer and more
administrable. Judicial review is part of the "evolutionary process of common-
law adjudication" that "give[s] meaning" to legal rules.' As courts see more
cases of a particular type, they can refine the line between protected speech
(such as non-obscene art, innocent error, or copying of ideas) and unprotected
speech (such as obscenity, punishable libel, or copying of expression). They
might create new subrules that clarify the meaning of the rules, for the benefit
of both future courts and future speakers. Or they might provide benchmarks
against which future courts can compare and contrast new fact patterns.
In Part I, we explain why Bose compels independent review of "substantial
similarity of expression" determinations.9 Though the great majority of circuits
5. Id. at 505.
6. See infra Section I.E.
7. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.
8. Id. at 502.
9. We discuss here "substantial similarity" rather than "probative similarity." Copyright law prohibits
(1) copying of (2) another's expression. Courts consider whether the plaintiff's and defendant's works are
similar for both prongs of this inquiry. For the first prong, they ask whether the similarity is probative of
the fact of copying; for the second, they ask whether the similarity is substantial enough to make the
defendant's action into copying of the expression and not just of the idea. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT § 8.0 (2d ed. 1996); MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGiT § 13-
28 n.3.2 (1997); Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity" as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths
in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1190 (1990). Probative similarity is relevant to a
purely factual question: Did copying take place? Substantial similarity, on the other hand, is a question of
degree and an application of law to fact.
We also don't discuss any glosses on substantial similarity that circuit courts have implemented, such
as the Ninth Circuit's bifurcated intrinsic/extrinsic test. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.
1990). Our points apply to substantial similarity of expression in all circuits.
Finally, we don't generally discuss independent review of fair use questions because courts already
conduct such review, at least when the factfinder below is a trial judge. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also Maxtone-Grahamn v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258-
59 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that fair use is for the trial judge to determine at summary judgment, so long
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have held, without considering free speech issues, that such determinations
should be reviewed only for clear error,"0 we believe these circuits are
mistaken. The doctrinal demands of Bose are quite clear. In Part H1, we argue
that there is nothing special about copyright cases that would justify departing
from the independent judgment rule. In light of this, giving copyright law a
free ride not given other speech restrictions is wrong and corrosive of people's
respect for free speech generally.
In Part Il, we ask whether this result-and Bose itself-makes sense. The
Supreme Court's "First Amendment due process"'" jurisprudence has been a
pragmatic, largely seat-of-the-pants, judgment about the real world impact of
various procedural devices, be they independent review, punitive damages, or
what have you. Could Bose be mistaken, either as applied to copyright law or
generally? Has the Court gone too far in constitutionalizing procedure as well
as substance in free speech cases? Should it return to treating speech-based
claims the same way that other claims-negligence claims, contract claims, and
the like-are treated?
We believe that the Court's judgments are probably correct: The error-
correcting and law-clarifying benefits of independent review exceed the costs
imposed on the system and on litigants by the increased likelihood of appeals.
Nonetheless, it is important to think skeptically about such broad but unproven
judicial pronouncements regarding the likely effects of law (here rules of
judicial review) on human action (here decisions by lower courts and by
creators). If people believe that independent review is inappropriate in
copyright cases, this might be an opportunity to rethink Bose generally.
Finally, in Part IV, we suggest that lawyers and scholars should consider
whether other "First Amendment due process" rules-rules that, for instance,
require proof by clear and convincing evidence or limit the availability of
punitive damages-likewise apply to copyright cases. This issue deserves more
attention than it has so far received.
I. WHY INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT REVIEW IS MANDATED
A. Freedom of Speech and Copyright
Copyright law restricts speech. It restricts you from writing, singing,
painting, or otherwise communicating what you please. 2 If your speech
copies ours, and if the copying uses our "expression," not merely our ideas or
as the underlying historical facts are not in dispute); infra Subsection IL.B.4. Tc points we make in this
Essay are, however, relevant to fair use cases involving review of jury verdicts.
10. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
I1. See Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process." 83 -ARV. L REv. 518 (1970).
12. Cf Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist. J.. dissenting) (citing copyright
law as an example of a speech restriction).
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the facts we have uncovered, your speech can be enjoined and punished, civilly
and sometimes criminally. 3 And copyright law applies to creative adaptation,
not just to literal copying. Rap musicians are restricted from including
"samples" of others' music in their own songs.' 4 Artists are forbidden from
creating artworks that are too similar to others' art.' 5 Writers are barred from
writing books-even books based on real events-whose plots are too similar
to what others have done. 16 Copyright law is a serious restriction on speakers'
ability to express themselves the way they want.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises7 made clear that
speech infringing another's copyright is not constitutionally shielded from
copyright law. Copyright's limitation on speech that uses others' expression is
justified because that limitation is itself an "engine of free expression": It
"supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."' 8 At the
same time, the Court strongly implied that this rationale would not justify
restrictions on speech copying facts or ideas. The Court characterized "the
Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas" as a "First Amendment protection[]."' 9 It
pointed out that "[n]o author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates, 20 and cited Justice Brennan's statement in New York Times Co. v.
United States2' that copyright laws are constitutional because they "protect
only the form of expression and not the ideas expressed. 22 And the Court
stressed that it would be an "abuse of the copyright owner's monopoly" for
copyright law to become "an instrument to suppress facts." 23
Harper & Row thus suggests that the line between using others' expression
and using their ideas is of First Amendment significance. Speech
communicating facts and ideas using expression that is substantially similar to
someone else's expression is constitutionally unprotected. 24  Speech
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 506 (1994) (criminalizing certain kinds of infringement).
14. See, e.g., Tin Pan Apple Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1791 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
23, 1994).
15. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987): Kisch
v. Ammirati & Purls Inc., 657 F. Supp. 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); cf. Woods v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
920 F Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (enjoining distribution of the movie 12 Monkeys because one scene
infringed on a copyrighted drawing).
16. See, e.g., Toksvig v. Bruce Publ'g Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936); cf. Judge Refuses To Halt Release of 'Amistad,' Rejects Writer's
Claim, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 1997, at B16 (describing a lawsuit by a writer who claimed that Steven
Spielberg's movie Amistad was based on her novel about the same historical incident, and the court's
conclusion that there was likely no infringement).
17. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
18. Id. at 558.
19. Id. at 560.
20. Id. at 556 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)).
21. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
22. Id. at 726 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring), cited in Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
23. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 559.
24. We mean "unprotected" in the literal sense: The speech may be constitutionally punished by
copyright law, despite the First Amendment, which means that the First Amendment doesn't protect the
2434 [Vol. 107: 2431
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communicating the same facts and ideas in other ways, however, is
constitutionally protected. 5  And such a dividing line makes good
constitutional sense: The free speech principle may tolerate certain limits on
how someone expresses an idea or a fact, but-whether one sees the principle
as primarily concerned with protecting self-expression, with fostering
democratic discourse, or with guarding the marketplace of ideas-it cannot
tolerate restrictions on communicating ideas and facts as such. When you
express an idea someone else pioneered or discuss facts that others have
uncovered, you might be free riding on their hard work, but it's a free ride we
must allow.26
B. Freedom of Speech and Appellate Review
Speech that copies another's expression is not, of course, the only category
of speech unprotected by the Free Speech Clause."7 Fighting words,
obscenity, and libel, for example, are also generally unprotected. For each
speech against legal sanction. In this respect, infringing speech is just like the traditional exceptons to First
Amendment protection, such as obscenity, defamation, fighting words, threats, child pornography, advocacy
of unlawful conduct that's intended and likely to produce imminent lawlessness, publication of saling dates
of troop ships, and the like. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster. Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurnng) (listing such exceptions).
We don't suggest that infringing speech is "valueless" Like advocacy of unla%%ful conduct, or
revelation of extremely sensitive government secrets, it can often be an important contribution to public
debate or, at least, public entertainment. It is punishable not because of its perceised lack of value, but
because of its perceived harm and the supposedly ample alternative avenues for expression But whateser
the reason, the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment against the operation of copynght law
Of course, speech that is unprotected against copyright law might still be protected against other laws:
The government may not, for instance, constitutionally apply a ban on racist speech or blasphemous speech
even to material that's infringing, just as it may not apply a ban on racist speech esen to matenal that
constitutes fighting words. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
25. Cf Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.. 433 U.S. 562. 577-78 n 13 (1977) As the Zacchini
Court wrote:
We note that Federal District Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to the federal
copyright law on the ground that "no restraint (has been] placed on the use of an idea or
concept." . . . See also W alt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates. 345 F. Supp 108. 115-116 (ND
Cal. 1972) (citing Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge The First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970), who argues that copyright law does not
abridge the First Amendment because it does not restrain the communication of ideas or
concepts) ....
Id. (some citations omitted) (alteration in original); see Lee v. Runge, 404 U S 887. 892 (1971) (Douglas,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Serious First Amendment questions would be raised if Congress'
power over copyrights were construed to include the power to grant monopolies o% er certain ideas."); Toro
Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (citing Harper & Ronw and stating that the
idea-expression dichotomy is partly grounded "in the First Amendment interest in the free exchange of
ideas"); see also Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1192 (1970) (stating that "the idea-expression line represents
an acceptable definitional balance as between copyright and free speech mterests"). Walt Disney Prods. v
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978) (similar); Sid & Many Krofft Television Prods, Inc. v
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the "idea-cxpresston dichotomy
already serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first amendment")
26. See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 25, at 1190-93.
27. Portions of the analysis in this section are borro%%ed from Eugene Volokh. Frredom of Speech and
Appellate Review in Workplace Harassment Cases. 90 Nw U. L. REv 1009 (1996)
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category, the Court has set forth rules defining the category's boundaries:
Defamatory statements about public figures, for instance, are actionable only
if made with "actual malice"-knowledge or reckless disregard of their
falsity.2 But these rules are not self-explanatory, and it's not enough for
appellate courts just to announce the rules and leave them to judges and juries
to apply. As the Bose Court wrote:
Providing triers of fact with a general description of the type of
communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not, in
and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to
eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the
expression of protected ideas.29
Therefore, the Court has held, courts must independently review judgments that
a certain statement is unprotected. In part, this simply prevents unconstitutional
results: Because erroneous denial of constitutional protection is a violation of
constitutional rights, courts must "exercise [independent] review in order to
preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution."3
But beyond that, independent review is also supposed to make the rule
clearer for future cases. Independent review should help "confine the
perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an
effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited."'" The content
of many Free Speech Clause rules "is not revealed simply by [their] literal
text" ;32 instead, the rules must be "given meaning through the evolutionary
process of common-law adjudication. 33 Therefore, appellate judges, "as
expositors of the Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence
in the record is sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold." 34
If appellate courts review decisions only for clear error, not independently,
the "evolutionary process of common-law adjudication" is substantially stunted.
Instead of marking out two areas-speech copying ideas and speech copying
expression--clear error review marks out three areas: (1) speech that any
reasonable factfinder would conclude only copies ideas; (2) speech that any
reasonable factfinder would conclude only copies expression; and (3) speech
28. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Curtis Publ'g Co. v.
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967).
29. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984). Professor Henry
Monaghan describes this quote and the statement quoted infra in the text accompanying note 34 as the
"core of the [Bose] opinion." Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229,
243 (1985).
30. Bose, 466 U.S. at 511; see id. at 505 ("The principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First
Amendment itself also imposes a special responsibility on judges whenever it is claimed that a particular
communication is unprotected." (citation omitted)).
31. Id. at 505.
32. Id. at 502.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 511.
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for which reasonable factfinders could disagree about whether it copies ideas
or expression. The third area is very big, and decisions that fall within this
area give little guidance. A factfinder doesn't get much value from a precedent
saying, "Reasonable factfinders could disagree whether speech x is
substantially similar in expression to speech y.,35 Likewise, such a precedent
gives little guidance to speakers who want to know what they can say and
what they can't. As the Court has recognized, when the rules are so vague,
many speakers will "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."'
Though Bose was a libel case, its justification for independent review
applies equally to copyright law: In both cases, some speech is protected and
some is not; in both cases, the factfinder may misclassify the speech as
unprotected, erroneously concluding that it was said with actual malice or that
it used another's expression; and in both cases, the rule's literal text provides
little guidance without case-by-case elaboration. Bose made clear that its rule
applies generally, beyond libel, to judgments that a certain kind of speech is
unprotected.37 More recent cases have faithfully applied Bose to alleged
obscenity,3 incitement, 39 negligent publication of criminal solicitation,"
speech by lawyers supposedly interfering with the administration of justice,'
35. Cf MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that the district court's
copyright infringement holding was not clearly erroneous, but stating that a contrary holding would likewise
not have been clearly erroneous).
36. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); cf Neil Weinstock Nctanel, Copyright and a
Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283, 303-04 (1996) (arguing that "the copynght law safeguards
that have made First Amendment defenses seem overly intrusive and unnecessary have in fact been only
sporadically effective in protecting First Amendment values," in part because "while the idcaicxpression
dichotomy makes sense in principle, it is notoriously malleable and indeterminate"); id. at 381 (descnbing
how "prevailing uncertainties" in copyright law interfere with the creation of certain kinds of new works).
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the ldea/Erprrssion Dichotomv and Copyright in a
Work's 'Total Concept and Feel,' 38 EmORY L.J. 393. 395-97 (1989) (stressing how the vagueness of the
idea-expression dichotomy can deter constitutionally protected speech); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman.
Information as Speech, Information as Goods, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 665, 709 (1992) (arguing that the
"fuzzed line between idea and expression" creates "uncertainty (that) can cast a serious chill on
communicative activities"). See generally Jessica Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright's Image.
22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 587, 600-02 (1997).
37. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 504-08 (citink Supreme Court cases applying the independent review rule
to fighting words, incitement, obscenity, and child pornography); see also Hurley v. lrish-Am. Gay. Lesbian
& Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 567 (1995) (applying Bose to the question of whether conduct was
expressive). The Court has used similar reasoning outside the speech context. See Omelas v. United States.
116 S. Ct. 1657, 1662 (1996) (applying a Bose-like analysis to probable cause decisions in Fourth
Amendment cases); Thompson v. Keohane. 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (applying a similar analysis to in-
custody determinations for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); Miller v. Fenton. 474
U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (applying Bose by analogy in the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause context
to the question of whether a confession was voluntary); cf. Murphy v. I.S.K.Con. of New England. Inc..
571 N.E.2d 340, 345 (Mass. 1991) (reading Bose as applicable to Free Exercise Clause issues); see also
discussion infra Subsection II.B.3.
38. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134. 138 (11th Cir. 1992).
39. See. e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1987). Yakubowicz v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989).
40. See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110. 1120-21 (1th Citr. 1992).
41. See, e.g., Standing Comm. v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1443 (9th Citr. 1995).
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government employee speech,42 speech in a possibly nonpublic forum, 43
commercial speech,44 and content-neutral speech restrictions.45
If anything, independent judgment review seems particularly proper in
copyright cases. 46 "Substantial similarity of expression" is an amorphous
term. It's at least as vague as "prurient interest '47 and "patently offensive"48
42. See, e.g., Swineford v. Snyder County, 15 F.3d 1258, 1265 (3d Cir. 1994); Mekss v. Wyoming
Girls' Sch., 813 P.2d 185, 194 (Wyo. 1991); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385-86 & n.9
(1987).
43. See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1994);
see also Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435, 1441 (10th Cir. 1990) (independently reviewing factual findings
underlying the determination of whether a forum is public), aff'd on reh'g, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991)
(en banc).
44. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990) (plurality
opinion); id. at 111-17 (Marshall, J., concurring) (engaging in independent review, but not citing Bose
directly); Revo v. Disciplinary Bd., 106 F.3d 929, 932 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2515 (1997);
Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 24 F.3d 754, 755-56 (5th Cir. 1994); Don's
Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 & n.9 (11th Cir. 1987).
Some cases reviewing federal administrative agency findings seem not to have followed Bose,
grounding their decisions on a deference-to-expert-agencies rationale. Two such cases involved review of
Federal Trade Commission findings that ads were false or misleading. See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311,
316-17 (7th Cir. 1992); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
In both cases, the courts also argued that Bose was inapplicable to commercial speech, but that seems to
be in considerable tension with the Supreme Court's position in Peel, as well as the circuit decisions in Joe
Conte Toyota, Revo, and Don's Porta Signs. Cf. Martin H. Redish, Product Health Claims and the First
Amendment, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1433, 1459-60 & n.144 (1990) (criticizing Brown & Williamson on Bose
grounds).
Another line of cases in which courts seem to have departed from Bose involves review of National
Labor Relations Board findings that unionization-related speech by an employer or a union was
impermissibly coercive. These cases follow NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969), which
held that "a reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first instance to judge the
impact of utterances made in the context of the employer-employee relationship." Since Gissel, lower courts
have not applied independent judgment in this area, but have instead reviewed NLRB findings for
"substantial evidence." E.g., DTR Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 106, 114 (6th Cir. 1994). Gissel came long
before Bose, and no court has confronted the tension between them, though distinguished commentators
have pointed to the discrepancy. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REv. 916, 976, 990 (1988); Monaghan, supra note 29, at 244 &
n.84, 258.
To our knowledge, no court or commentator has suggested that substantial evidence review be
transplanted from the expert agency setting to the review of findings made by judges and juries, where Bose
is firmly entrenched. Indeed, the only non-agency case we could find that declined to follow Bose in
determining whether speech is unprotected, Levine v. CMP Publications, Inc., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1984),
seems no longer to be good law. Levine involved a finding that defamatory statements about private figures
were made negligently. The court reasoned that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
"allowfed] the states to regulate [private figure defamation] within much less restrictive bounds than those
imposed [on public figure defamation]" and that therefore Bose was inapplicable. Levine, 738 F.2d at 672
n.19. But after Levine was decided, the Supreme Court made clear that Bose does indeed apply to
negligence findings in private figure cases. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990);
see also LeDoux v. Northwest Publ'g, Inc., 521 N.W.2d 59, 69 (Minn. App. 1994) (applying Bose in such
a situation); Turf Lawnmower Repair, Inc. v. Bergen Record Corp., 655 A.2d 417,423 (N.J. 1994) (same).
45. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 666-67 (1994); Association
of Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591, 595-96 (8th Cir. 1991).
46. In fact, refining the definition of"substantial similarity of expression" serves the goals of copyright
law as well as of the First Amendment: "Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching
the general public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of
copyright law be demarcated as clearly as possible." Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
47. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 506 (1984).
48. Id.
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(elements of the obscenity test), and probably vaguer than "reckless
disregard"49 (part of the libel test) and "likely to provoke the average person
to retaliation"50 (part of the fighting-words test). No longstanding social
consensus tells us what is "idea" and what is "expression"; indeed, no
intuitively obvious line divides the two categories. Under Bose, this is
precisely the sort of test that courts must police and clarify through
case-by-case adjudication, and not leave entirely to the ad hoc decisions of
judges and jurors."
C. Appellate Review and Copyright
Today, many circuit courts review substantial-similarity-of-expression
findings made in bench trials for clear error,5 2 though the Second Circuit,
perhaps joined by the Eleventh, applies independent judgment (also known in
this context as de novo review).53 All circuits review copyright jury verdicts
by asking whether any reasonable jury could have reached the verdict.5
Despite this practice, the de novo standard of review may often be proper
even as a nonconstitutional matter. Most courts have reviewed substantial
similarity of expression for clear error because they have treated it as a factual
question. 55 The substantial-similarity-of-expression judgment, however, is
really an application of law to fact, also known as a mixed question of law and
fact. When one compares two works to see if they are substantially similar, the
facts of their contents are uncontroverted; the issue is whether the expression
in those contents passes the legal test of substantial similarity. Most circuits
49. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
50. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568. 574 (1942)
51. The Bose rule applies equally to jury trials and bench trals. See Bose. 466 U S at 508 & n 27
(citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285). New lork Tines Co v Sutlhsan specifically held
that the Seventh Amendment's ban on reexamination of "'factis] red by a jury" didn't preclude
independent review by appellate courts in constitutional cases. 376 U.S. at 285 & n 26
52. See Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab.. Inc.. 797 F2d 1222. 1233 (3d Cir 1986). Hennon
v. Kirkland's Inc., No. 94-2595, 1995 WL 490266. at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17. 1995). Kepner-Tregoc. Inc v
Leadership Software, Inc., 12 F.3d 527, 534 (5th Cir. 1994); Wildlife Express Corp v Carol Wright Sales.
Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 506 (7th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Kaag Mfrs., Inc.. 338 F2d 949. 951 (9th Cir 1964)
53. See Knitwares, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd.. 71 F.3d 996. 1002 (2d Cir 1995); Sherry Mfg Co v Toel
King of Fla., Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1569 n.6 (IIth Cir. 1985). But see Original Appalachian Ar.works. Inc
v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 E2d 821, 825 & n.4 (I Ith Cir. 1982) (reiestmg for clear error) In ,ihTek Holdings.
Inc. v. Arce Engineering Co., 89 F.3d 1548, 1554 (11th Cir. 1996). the Elescnth Circuit identified the idea-
expression determination as a mixed question of law and fact; the Eleventh Circuit generally resiews such
questions de novo, see International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F2d 1447. 1453 (11th Cir 1989). but MiTek
Holdings did not clearly indicate the standard of review that it was applying.
54. See, e.g., CMM Cable Rep., Inc. v. Ocean Coast Properties, Inc.. 97 F3d 1504, 1525 (Ist Cir
1996) (reviewing a copyright case in the "light most favorable to the jury's verdict"). see also. e g.. Gaste
v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1988); Ford Motor Co. v Summit Motor Prods. Inc . 930
F.2d 277, 290 (3d Cir. 1991); Transgo. Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Partns Corp.. 768 F2d 1001. 1013-14 (9th
Cir. 1985).
55. This is probably ight for probative similanty. though not for substantial similanty Cf supra note
9 (distinguishing the two). The failure of many courts to distinguish clearly between these two kinds of
similarity may help explain why they use clear error review for both.
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hold that such mixed questions should generally be reviewed de novo, and that
Rule 52(a)56 dictates clear error review only for purely factual questions.5 7
General jury verdicts, however, are always reviewed deferentially unless the
Constitution commands otherwise."
How would a de novo standard work in practice? Say a factfinder finds that
a defendant's work is substantially similar in its expression to the plaintiff's
work. And say the court of appeals, applying independent judgment, disagrees.
This decision will then become a benchmark against which future courts-and,
better yet, future creators and publishers-can compare and contrast their cases.
Of course, no two fact patterns are identical, but the data points may add up. As
the Supreme Court said when adopting an independent review standard for
similarly vague Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations, "[E]ven
where one case may not squarely control another one, the two decisions when
viewed together may usefully add to the body of law on the subject."5 9 With
each new binding decision, the rule becomes a little clearer.
Independent judgment review need not-and cannot-reexamine all the
factual findings involved in the lower court's decision. The appellate court
may, for instance, defer to the factfinder's judgments about witness
credibility.' In jury cases, the court will generally have to assume that the
jurors believed the winning side's factual claims. But even if this is done, the
question will remain: Accepting the winner's story about the historical facts,
are the two works substantially similar in their expression? The appellate court
can make this decision at least as well as a jury or a trial judge.6t
56. FED R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings of fact... shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses.").
57. See, e.g., Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1988); American Geophysical Union
v. Texaco Inc., 37 E3d 881, 886 (2d Cir. 1994); North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d
1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995); Estate of Waters v. Commissioner, 48 E3d 838, 842 (4th Cir. 1995); Davis v.
Odeco, Inc., 18 F.3d 1237, 1245 n.30 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Clark, 982 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.
1993); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 48 F3d 365, 369 (8th Cir. 1995);
Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1375 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1988); International Ins. Co.. 874 F.2d at 1453. But
see Williams v. Poulos, I 1 F.3d 271, 278 & n.ll (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that mixed questions of law and
fact should be reviewed with varying degrees of deference, depending on how "fact dominated" the
question is); Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Bank, 880 F.2d 928, 933 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (stating
that "fact-bound" mixed questions of law and fact should be reviewed for clear error); Ershick v. United
Mo. Bank, 948 F.2d 660, 666 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that "mixed questions of fact and law are reviewed
under either the clearly erroneous or de novo standards, depending on whether the mixed question involves
primarily a question of fact or the considering of legal principles"). The Supreme Court has not resolved
this question. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982).
58. See, e.g., MacArthur v. University of Tex. Health Ctr., 45 F.3d 890, 896 (5th Cir. 1995); Ingram
v. Acands, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th Cir. 1992); Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F2d 793, 797 (11 th Cir.
1993); Therma-Tru Corp. v. Peachtree Doors Inc., 44 F.3d 988, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Meyers v. Chapman
Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814, 822-23 (Ky. 1992).
59. Omelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996).
60. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,688-89 (1989); Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499-500 (1984).
61. Indeed, this is the rationale underlying the Second Circuit's de novo review for substantial
similarity findings. See Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 E2d 1315, 1317 (2d Cir
1969) ("As we have before us the same record, and as no part of the decision below turned on credibility,
we are in as good a position to determine the question as is the district court.").
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Skeptics may suggest that, in practice, the standard of review matters
little-that judges will manipulate the standard to reach the results they want.
We disagree. Doubtless such manipulation sometimes happens, but in our
experience courts generally do take the standard of review seriously. Courts
certainly say that standards of review matter,62 and it seems that standards of
review must sometimes make a difference.63
Without independent judgment review, binding precedents are set only when
a court concludes that no reasonable factfinder could find liability or fail to find
liability. By definition, this happens only in rather extreme cases--cases in
which a court could find that a jury would have to be, in one judge's words,
"drunk or crazy" to conclude that the defendant's speech was substantially
similar in its expression to the plaintiff's,' a hard standard to meet. Thus,
unless courts use independent judgment review, the line between what's allowed
and what's forbidden will rarely be made clearer for future cases.
D. Appellate Review in Cases Won by Defendants
Bose did leave a significant question unresolved: Is independent judgment
review proper if the defendant wins at trial? The lower courts are split on this.
62. See, e.g., Bose, 466 U.S. at 499-500; United States v. D'Ambmsio. No. 92-10526. 1993 WL
410454, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 14, 1993) (stating that "the standard of review controls the outcome of this
case"); United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1204 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that "the standard of review can
be outcome determinative"); Payne v. Borg, 982 F.2d 335. 338 (9th Cir. 1992) ("The relevant standards
of review are critical to the outcome of this case."); United States v. Vontsteen. 950 F.2d 1086. 1091 (5th
Cir. 1992) (en bane) (stating that "the standard chosen often affects the outcome of the case").
63. See, e.g., Paul R. Michel, Advocacy in the Federal Circuit. C961 A.LI.-A.B.A. 5. 8 (1994) ("One
of my main messages to you [as a circuit judge of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) is that
standards of review influence dispositions in the Federal Circuit far more than many advocates realize.");
see also Sally Baumler, Appellate Review Under the Bail Reform Act, 1992 U. ILL L REv. 483, 486
("Because the standard of review can affect the outcome of a case, one of the first issues in any appeal is
the proper standard of appellate review to be applied."); W. Wendell Hall. Standards of Appellate Review
in Civil Cases, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 865, 867-68 (1990) ("Because the appropnate standard of review will
control the outcome of an appeal, appellate practitioners must consider the standard of review with the same
thoughtful consideration that they give to the facts and the substantive law."); William H. Kenety.
Observations on Teaching Appellate Advocacy, 45 J. LEGAL EDuc. 582, 586 (1995) ("The applicable
standard of review determines the outcome of many appellate decisions."): cf. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(6)
(requiring appellants to brief the standard of review); United States v. McConney. 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-204
(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (discussing standards of review at length): Michael Asimow, The Scope of
Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies. 42 UCLA L REV. 1157. 1189 n.112
(1995) ("As an extreme example, one practitioner told me that in many years of practice representing
professional licensees ... he had never lost an independent judgment case and never won a substantial
evidence case.").
64. Layman v. Combs, 994 F.2d 1344, 1355 (9th Cir. 1992) (Kozinski. J., dissenting in part)
(discussing the nature of review under a "no rational trier of fact" standard in a similar context). Of course,
this does sometimes happen. See, e.g., Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the movie Honey; I Shrunk the Kids did not infringe a screenplay called The Formula);
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the movie Coma did not infringe a screen
treatment called Reincarnation, Inc.); Litchfield v. Spielberg. 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
the movie E.T. did not infringe a musical play called Lokeyfrom Maldemar). Summary judgment in favor
of the plaintiff seems rarer, but does happen occasionally. See, e.g.. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that the sculpture String of Puppies infringed a photograph called Puppies).
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Some courts stress that independent judgment review aims at developing and
refining the constitutional rules.65 This development would happen regardless
of who won below, which suggests that independent judgment review should
apply symmetrically. Other courts stress Bose's other rationale: that appellate
review decreases the chances that constitutionally protected speech would be
erroneously punished. Under this view, when the free speech claimant wins
below, there's no risk that the factfinder has erroneously abridged a
constitutional right.66 Indeed, independent appellate review in this situation
increases the chance of erroneously punishing protected speech (though it
decreases the chance of erroneously protecting unprotected speech). Moreover,
the argument goes, courts can't adopt independent judgment review just for
prudential reasons. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) for bench
trials, and the Seventh Amendment for jury trials, appellate courts must review
factual findings for clear error.
In our view, independent judgment review of the idea-expression decision
is valuable even when the defendant won at trial: Whoever won, independent
review should produce more refinement of the legal standard, something Bose
says is constitutionally valuable. Moreover, a symmetric rule is fairer to
plaintiffs. Copyright plaintiffs' claims are not claims of constitutional right, but
they are certainly important; as Harper & Row pointed out, copyright law itself
serves First Amendment goals.67
For review of bench trials, the symmetric approach can be used whether
or not one concludes that Bose requires it as a constitutional matter; as we
mentioned above, most circuits hold that decisions involving application of law
to fact may be reviewed de novo without running afoul of Rule 52(a).6" And
the rationale for reviewing mixed questions de novo-that questions that
involve "strik[ing] a balance between two sometimes conflicting societal
values" and that are therefore "of clear precedential importance" 69 should be
decided by appellate courts-applies well in the copyright context.
Independent judgment review probably can't work, regardless of how one
reads Bose, when the court is reviewing a jury's general verdict for a
defendant. Copyright claims involve subsidiary factual inquiries. When the
65. See Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 n.9 (I Ith Cir. 1987);
Bartimo v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n, 771 F.2d 894, 897 (5th Cir. 1985); Lewis v.
Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 941 P.2d 266, 270-71 (Colo. 1997); see also Lindsay v. City of San
Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying independent judgment review even though the
free speech claimant won below, though not discussing whether the standard should be symmetrical);
Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 745 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1984) (same).
66. See Multimedia Publ'g Co. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 160 (4th Cir.
1993); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th Cir. 1985); Brown v. K.N.D. Corp., 529 A.2d 1292,
1295-96 (Conn. 1987); see also Don's Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981-82 (1988)
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting a split among the lower courts).
67. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
69. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane).
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defendant wins, it might be either because the jury concludes that there was
no substantial similarity of expression or, for instance, because the jury
concludes that there was independent creation and thus no copying at all. The
court of appeals has no way of knowing the real reason, and thus can't reverse
even if it thinks there was substantial similarity of expression. Review of
special verdicts, however, is practically possible, and the Seventh Amendment,
which bars reexamination only of "fact[s] tried by a jury,"7 probably doesn't
prevent appellate courts from reviewing mixed questions of law and fact.7
E. Applying These Principles to Summary Judgment and Motions for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (J.N. 0. V)
The same principles apply when trial courts review motions for summary
judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In such cases, our
analysis suggests that the court must independently decide whether the two
works are indeed substantially similar in their expression, and not just whether
a reasonable jury could so find.
This makes sense, doctrinally, practically, and theoretically. Doctrinally,
federal courts have held that the Bose reasoning applies to decisions on
summary judgment72 and motion for j.n.o.v." Practically, for j.n.o.v.
70. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
71- See Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy Efficiency. and Accountability in the ltgation Process-The Case
for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 15, 32, 56-57 (1990); Colleen P. Murphy. Integrating the
Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries. 61 GEO. WASii. L. RE1'. 723. 749 (1993). But see
Robert Dudnik, Comment, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of te Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 YALE Li.
483, 502-03 (1965).
72. See, e.g., Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723. 725 (10th Cir 1996); Price v. Viking Penguin. Inc..
881 F.2d 1426, 1434 (8th Cir. 1989); Secrist v. Harkin, 874 F.2d 1244. 1251 (8th Cir. 1989), Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Liberty Lobby. Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co..
838 F.2d 1287, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (applying Bose on appellate review of a summary judgment decision
and stating that "[flirst amendment concerns also affect a court's posture in reviewing the evidence
presented on summary judgment"); Herbert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298. 308 (2d Cir 1986) (applying Bose on
appellate review of a summary judgment decision); Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable Inc.. 780
F.2d 340, 352 n.17 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concumng); Bartumo v. Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective
Ass'n, 771 F.2d 894, 895-98 (5th Cir. 1985): Hardin v. Santa Fe Reporter. Inc.. 745 F.2d 132.3. 1326 (10th
Cir. 1984); Foretich v. American Broad. Co., Nos. Civ.A.93-2620 & Civ.A.94-0037(HHG). 1997 WL
669644 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1997) (applying Bose at summary judgment); Davidson v. Time Warner. Inc.. No.
Civ.A.V-94-006, 1997 WL 405907, at *16 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31. 1997); Rice v. Paladin Enters.. Inc., 940
F. Supp. 836, 844 (D. Md. 1996). rev'd on other grounds. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F. Supp. 1240. 1245 (N.D. 111. 1986). aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1987). But see Liberty Lobby. Inc. v. Anderson. 746
F.2d 1563, 1571 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding the Bose requirement inapplicable to appellate review of a grant
of summary judgment), rev'd on other related grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). and since abandoned,
Liberty Lobby Inc., v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d at 1293; Coughlin v. Westinghouse Broad. & Cable.
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 377, 389 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (same), aff'd on other grounds. 780 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1986).
Some of these cases apply Bose on appellate review of a tral cour's summary judgment decision.
For the reasons we give in this subsection, it would make no sense to apply a different standard to the trial
court's decision itself.
73. See, e.g., Crowder v. Housing Auth., 990 F.2d 586. 594 n.15 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating that the
"plaintiff was entitled-under ordinary Federal Rules standards (and even more in the light of Bose's
admonition to judges about mixed questions of law and facty---to a judgment as a matter of law on most
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motions, the court of appeals would review the matter independently in any
event, assuming an appeal were filed. There's no reason to deny the losing
party this independent review until the appellate court rules; and providing this
review up front might be more likely to reach the right result even when no
appeal is filed. 74 The same goes for summary judgment: If, resolving all the
underlying factual claims in the movant's favor, the court still concludes that
there's no sufficient similarity of expression, there's no reason to delay this
judgment until the j.n.o.v. motion or until review by the court of appeals. In
fact, having trial courts review the evidence deferentially and then having
appellate courts review it independently would lead to needless reversals,
reversals which might have been avoided if the trial courts reviewed the
evidence independently to begin with.
Theoretically, at least one of the underlying principles of Bose applies fully
to trial court review: Trial courts as well as courts of appeals have a duty to
prevent erroneous denials of constitutional protection. The other principle-the
notion that judicial decisions can help clarify the law-is somewhat less
applicable, but still retains considerable force. In copyright practice, district
court decisions, if published, are often quite influential: 75 Because copyright
lawsuits are mainly about money, losing parties often settle or just give up
rather than appeal. District court decisions that something is or is not, as a
matter of law, infringement can thus be important benchmarks that help "give[]
meaning [to the rules] through the evolutionary process of common-law
adjudication. 76
In any event, as the cases cited above show, the principle that Bose
generally applies on summary judgment and motion for j.n.o.v. is well
entrenched in the case law. The burden is on those who would carve out a
special copyright exception. For the reasons we discuss in the next part, we are
skeptical that this burden can be met.
F. Lawyers Should at Least Ask for Independent Review
Whether or not the above claims are sure winners, they are at least
colorable enough that lawyers who lose at trial ought to raise them. Stare
decisis doesn't prevent courts from adopting this approach, even if they have
of his constitutional claims"); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (N.D. Cal.
1993), aff'd, 85 F3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1996); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 313, 317
(S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1986).
74. It is, of course, possible that the district court's independent review would reach one result and
the court of appeals's independent review would reach another, in retrospect, then, one might say that the
district court's independent review was a waste of time. But unless the substantial-similarity-of-expression
test is indeed entirely indeterminate, we would assume that by and large the district court and the court of
appeals would come to the same, one hopes correct, conclusion.
75. Those skeptical about this might check out any copyright casebook or treatise, and see how many
of the leading cases discussed there are district court cases.
76. Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984).
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in the past reviewed substantial-similarity-of-expression findings only for clear
error; none of the cases adopting a clear error standard considered Bose. When
a new argument is raised that wasn't considered in a prior case, a court isn't
bound by the prior decision." And our proposal is hardly radical: As we
discuss below, in Subsection II.B.4, some circuits have indeed accepted
independent review-though not on constitutional grounds-with no obvious
ill effects.
II. IS COPYRIGHT DIFFERENT?
So far, we have argued: (1) that copyright law restricts speech, but speech
that copies another's expression is constitutionally unprotected; (2) that the
Court in Bose mandated independent review of judgments that a particular
instance of speech falls into a constitutionally unprotected category; and (3)
that independent review is therefore required for judgments that a particular
instance of speech copies another's expression.
But might copyright law somehow differ from other speech restrictions
(libel law, obscenity law, and the like), and thus deserve different treatment?
We have certainly heard this view from many, and especially from copyright
lawyers. Though copyright law is clearly a speech restriction, to many it lacks
that speech restriction flavor. It doesn't sound like censorship, only private
people lawfully enforcing their property rights. Still, while many have this
intuition, the question remains: Is there some specific reason underlying it,
some reason that can justify setting aside the normal First Amendment
procedural guarantees?
A. The First Amendment Interest
1. Property Rights
The argument that copyright law should be immune from standard First
Amendment procedural rules because it protects property rights strikes us as
a non sequitur.78 Free speech guarantees can't be avoided simply by
characterizing a speech restriction as an "intellectual property law." After all,
one could plausibly view libel law as protecting a person's property interest
77. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 678 (1994) (plurality opinion) (i[Cases cannot be read
as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt with."); Miller v. California Pac. Med. Ctr.. 991 F.2d 536,
541 (9th Cir. 1993).
78. Compare Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders. Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters. Inc.. 600 F.2d 1184. 1188 (5th
Cir. 1979) (concluding that prior restraint doctrine doesn't apply to copyright and trademark cases because
"[t]he first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property").
with L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 29 (Ist Cir. 1987) (disagreeing with this in the
trademark context and stating that "the constitutional issue raised here cannot be dispensed with by simply
asserting that Bean's property right need not yield to the exercise of first amendment rights-).
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in his reputation, or a company's property interest in its product's
reputation; 79 yet the First Amendment clearly limits libel law.8" One still has
to ask-as the Supreme Court has asked in its free speech-intellectual property
cases 8 1 -whether these intellectual property laws are unconstitutional speech
restrictions, and, if they are substantively constitutional, what procedural
protections the First Amendment nonetheless requires.
Of course, we don't deny that property laws are sometimes relevant to
analyzing free speech claims: The First Amendment does not, for instance,
license people to trespass on private real estate in order to speak.82 But
trespass laws are generally applicable to all conduct, speech or not, and operate
without regard to the communicative impact of the speech; it makes sense not
to view them as general speech restrictions for purposes of the independent
review doctrine. But content-based laws, specifically targeted at speech, must
be seen as speech restrictions, whether or not one frames them as "property"
rules. They may be substantively valid speech restrictions, but our calling them
property rules doesn't justify exempting them from the normal First
Amendment procedural principles. This is especially so when they ban people
from saying a particular thing anywhere, at any time, and not just on others'
private property.
2. Private Enforcement
Copyright law is largely enforced by private litigation, not government
prosecution, so one might argue that it is much less likely to turn into an
engine of censorship. But of course libel law is also enforced almost entirely
by private litigation. Despite this, libel law is understood to be a government-
imposed restriction,83 even if the regime of private enforcement makes it a
little harder for the government to use the restriction as part of a coherent
censorship campaign.84 Bose itself involved a private company suing over a
79. Reputation is generally not a property interest for purposes of the U.S. Constitution's Due Process
Clause, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), but it may be a property right for other purposes, see, e.g.,
Marrero v. City of Hialeah, 625 F.2d 499, 514 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that Florida law recognizes business
reputation as a property interest, at least to the extent that it approximates goodwill); Nossen v. -oy, 750
F. Supp. 740, 743 (E.D. Va. 1990) (holding that "an individual holds a... property interest in his or her
reputation" for purposes of Washington and Virginia conversion law).
80. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
81. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522
(1987) (quasi-trademark); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)
(copyright); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (right of publicity).
82. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
83. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 265 ("Although [a libel suit] is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the [state] courts have applied a state rule of law .... It matters not that that law
has been applied in a civil action .... ").
84. Query whether privately enforced laws might actually prove to be more restrictive than
government-enforced ones. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex reL Schumen, 117 S. Ct. 1871,
1877 (1997) (suggesting that private, self-interested enforcement of legal rules may be more zealous and
more thorough than direct government enforcement).
[Vol. 107: 24312446
Free Speech and Copyright
statement that the government cared little about; nonetheless, the Court held
that the First Amendment's procedural protections applied. The same should
be true for copyright law.
3. Content Neutrality
Nor is intellectual property law content neutral and therefore (as some
have argued)85 subject to laxer rules. To begin with, independent review is
still required in cases involving content-neutral restrictions.6 But beyond this,
copyright liability turns on the content of what is published. True, the law
draws no ideological distinctions; just like libel laws, obscenity laws, and
fighting-words laws, copyright law applies equally to speech advocating
democracy, speech advocating communism, and speech with no ideological
message at all. But while this might make the law viewpoint neutral, it doesn't
make it content neutral,87 and doesn't warrant ignoring the Bose rule.
4. Subject Matter of the Jeopardized Speech
One might suggest that copyright lawsuits pose little threat to free speech
because they typically involve nonpolitical matters; after all, if a court
erroneously concludes that Battlestar Galactica infringes the plot of Star
Wars, 8 will the Republic really fall? When the risk of error or chill falls only
on such pedestrian material, the argument might go, there's no need for special
procedural protections.
Bose itself, however, was a trade libel case, involving nothing more
significant than a product review of a stereo speaker system. The Court
likewise applies independent review in obscenity and fighting-words
cases,89 even though the risk of error or chill in such cases is typically
borne by nonpolitical speech.90 The same is true for commercial speech
85. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA. Inc., 109 F.3d 1394. 1403 n.I (9th Cir.)
(citing Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979)
(holding that trademark law is content neutral)), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 27 (1997).
86. See Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC (Turner I). 512 U.S. 622. 665 (1994)- Association of
Community Orgs. for Reform Now v. St. Louis County, 930 F.2d 591. 595-96 (8th Cir. 1991).
87. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191. 197 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that all
content-based restrictions, even viewpoint-neutral ones, are constitutionally suspect): Boos v. Barry. 485
U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (same); Arkansas Writers' Project. Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221. 230 (1987) (same);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n.6 (1980) (same); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n.
447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980) (same).
88. See Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp. v. MCA. Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983).
89. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
90. In fact, in obscenity and fighting-words cases, the risk of error is borne by speech that at least
some Justices have claimed is of low constitutional value. Compare Young v. American Mini Theatres,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-73 (1976) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that pornography is of low constitutional
value), and FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978) (plurality opinion) (suggesting that profanity
is of low constitutional value), with R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. 505 U.S. 377. 390 n.6 (1992) (stressing that
this view has never commanded a majority of the Court). Entertainment, even nonpolitical entertanment.
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cases.9' And, of course, quite a few copyright cases do involve political
speech (consider Harper & Row itself), and quite a few libel cases involve
material that seems to be as much "entertainment" as a typical movie or
novel. 92
5. It's All the Cost of Doing Business
Many copyrights-especially those that actually end up in litigation-are
exploited by fairly large businesses. One might argue that the chilling effect
of legal uncertainty is less of a problem when lawsuits are just a cost of doing
business; Twentieth-Century Fox, the argument might go, just isn't going to
be very chilled by the risk of copyright litigation.93
But this in no way differentiates copyright from libel law. Most libel
defendants are also large businesses, whose job is reporting and whose
business interests in many respects counteract any chilling effect the law could
have. Still, we worry that libel lawsuits might lead even the richest newspapers
to soft-pedal certain issues: Even wealthy entities that can afford a lawsuit
might still be reluctant to face one; businesses try hard to minimize their costs
of doing business.
The same goes for copyright cases. A movie studio may be able to bear
the costs of litigation over, say, a docudrama that's similar to another story
based on the same set of facts, but this doesn't mean that the studio will be
willing to bear this cost. It might decide to do another story instead-perhaps
no great loss to the world, but no less a loss than in the typical libel situation.
6. Copyright Law Furthers Free Speech Values
Nor can copyright law be exempted from the general Bose rule because
"copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expression."94 Copyright law's
speech-enhancing effect, coupled with its specific constitutional
authorization,' justifies holding copyright law to be a substantively valid
96speech restriction. But procedural rules, such as the independent review
has always been held to be of high constitutional value. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510
(1948).
91. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. Cf Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (involving a libel action based on a story about
the divorce of a wealthy socialite); Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974) (involving a
false light privacy action based on a sensational crime story more akin to a modem docudrama than to
political speech); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (same).
93. Cf Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321, 1329-34 (1992)
(suggesting that the chilling effect of libel law on media businesses is less than one might think).
94. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ).
96. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558-60.
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requirement, exist to make sure that even substantively valid speech restrictions
don't end up restricting speech that should remain protected.
Moreover, independent appellate review would not in any event greatly
diminish the incentive provided by copyright law, just as such review does not
greatly diminish the force of libel law or obscenity law. Refining the
substantial-similarity-of-expression test actually fits well with copyright policy
as well as with First Amendment law: "Because copyright law ultimately
serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative
works, it is peculiarly important that the boundaries of copyright law be
demarcated as clearly as possible."'97 If anything, the premise that copyright
law furthers free speech values makes it especially important tha: copyright
cases be accurately decided, since error in either direction (too much protection
or too little) implicates a First Amendment interest. If Bose is correct-if
independent appellate review is important to correct unconstitutional results
and to refine the rules, thus reducing the risk of such errors in the future-then
independent review is doubly valuable for copyright cases.
We are also generally skeptical of distinguishing supposedly speech-
furthering restrictions from other restrictions. Many kinds of speech restrictions
may be seen as furthering speech in some way. Justice White made this
argument about libel law, claiming that "virtually unrestrained defamatory
remarks about private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and
concerning themselves with social problems."98 Some have likewise argued
that pornography tends to "silence" women, which might suggest that
obscenity law may serve First Amendment values.' Similarly, Justice Jackson
argued that bans on strident public denunciations of a religion may serve First
Amendment religious freedom values.' I°
Some contend that these arguments justify substantive speech restrictions
and some contend the opposite. 10' Regardless of how one comes down on
this question, however, the arguments do not justify exemption from the
normal procedural rules that make sure the substantive rules are accurately
applied. And in any event, copyright law's supposed speech-enhancing effects
cannot justify a special exemption for copyright law alone.
97. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994).
98. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323. 400 (1974) (White. J., dissenting): see also id.
(endorsing the view that "fascists' effective use of defamatory attacks on their opponents" suggests that "the
law of libel ... (may be] important for modem democratic survival" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
99. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN & CAThARINE A. MACKINNON. PORNOGRAP'HY AND CIVIL RIGHTs:
A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN'S EQUALITY 47-48 (1988); Paul E. McGreal. Constitutional Illiteracy. 30 IND.
L. REV. 693, 697 n.30 (1997) (book review) (discussing this argument).
100. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 302 (1951) (Jackson. J., dissenting).
101. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Constitutional Tension Method. 3 U.
CHI. ROUNDTABLE 223 (1996).
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7. The Copyright and Patent Clause
The Constitution specifically refers to the government interest underlying
copyright law: Article I, Section 8 authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'" Harper & Row mentioned this as one reason that copyright
law is a constitutionally permissible speech restriction. 3
But the existence of congressional power under the Copyright and Patent
Clause can't exempt copyright law from all First Amendment scrutiny. The
point of the Bill of Rights is to restrain the federal government in the exercise
of its enumerated powers: For instance, the government has the enumerated
power to run the post office, but this doesn't mean it can refuse to carry
communist propaganda.'4 Likewise, in exercising its copyright power,
Congress is bound by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. 5 Copyright
law must likewise be bound by the First Amendment.
We agree that it would be unsound to read the First Amendment as
entirely eliminating the copyright power created by the Framers only two years
earlier.' 6 The Copyright and Patent Clause does represent the Framers'
judgment that "copyright itself [can] be the engine of free expression,"' °7 so
courts ought not, in their zeal to protect speech, eviscerate the incentive that
copyright law provides. This was good reason for Harper & Row to conclude
that copyright law is substantively constitutional. But it hardly shows that
copyright law ought to be free of the traditional procedural protections
available in all other First Amendment cases.' Independent appellate review
102. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
103. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985); cf. CablelHome
Communication Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 849 (11 th Cir. 1990) ("Since the Copyright
Act is the congressional implementation of a constitutional directive to encourage inventors by protecting
their exclusive rights in their discoveries, copyright interests also must be guarded under the Constitution,
and injunctive relief is a common judicial response to infringement of a valid copyright (despite the normal
First Amendment due process rule against prior restraints]."); I RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:58, at 15-88 (3d ed. 1996) (stating that "the fact that copyright
protection is itself a value of constitutional dimension, vindicating the directive of the Constitution's
Copyright Clause" justifies the issuance of injunctions).
104. See, e.g., Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (striking down a restriction on
mailing of communist advocacy); see also, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-80 (1983)
(striking down on First Amendment grounds a law enacted pursuant to the Federal District Clause power);
Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639, 1649-50 (1993).
105. See, e.g., Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. Does, 876 F. Supp. 407, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
(holding that ex parte seizure of supposedly infringing materials, though authorized by the Copyright Act,
was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment).
106. Cf. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930) ("The first ten amendments and the original
Constitution were substantially contemporaneous and should be construed in pari materia.").
107. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558.
108. But see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (concluding that Harper & Row implicitly validated all the provisions of the
Copyright Act, including those providing for preliminary injunctions, even though preliminary injunctions
against speech are generally prohibited by the prior restraint doctrine).
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would not eviscerate or even greatly diminish the incentive provided by
copyright law, just as it does not eviscerate libel law or obscenity law. It
would merely require that the law be enforced in a slightly different way.
8. Importance of the Government Interest
Finally, one might correctly point out that the interest upheld by copyright
law-the interest in providing an incentive for disseminating ideas-is, even
without regard to its constitutional status, quite important. We do not doubt
that this is so, but lots of speech restrictions are justified by important
interests. Preventing incitement to imminent violence is surely an important
interest, too, as are protecting individual reputation" 9 and combatting child
pornography."0 Yet independent review applies in each of these cases."'
Independent review doesn't prevent these interests from being served; it just
requires that they be served through a certain set of procedures.
B. Is Trying To Refine the Idea-Expression Dichotomy Pointless?
The first foundation for Bose review-the normative obligation to protect
speech from erroneous restriction-thus applies to copyright law as well as it
does to libel law, obscenity law, and all the other areas where Bose review is
required. The heart of any assertion that Bose ought not apply to copyright
cases must be a claim that the second justification-that independent review
will help the rule evolve through case-by-case adjudication-is simply factually
incorrect for copyright cases: that, as Judge Learned Hand suggested, decisions
about substantial similarity of expression "must ... inevitably be ad hoc," and
the test must therefore be "of necessity vague. '"1"2 Perhaps common law
adjudication cannot give the line more meaning than the words themselves
offer. Perhaps ultimately each factfinder must draw the line anew, based on its
own notions of what is an "idea" and what is "expression." Perhaps new
subrules and benchmark decisions are useless.
We think there is a kernel of truth to this argument, but not enough to
justify departing from Bose. True, the idea-expression dichotomy is necessarily
vague, and additional refinement by appellate decisions will not make it vastly
clearer. Still, the appellate decisionmaking that independent review makes
possible will probably provide some extra clarity, some extra guidance for
litigants and lower courts. This, coupled with the normative argument we have
presented above, is enough to warrant following Bose even in copyright cases.
109. See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1. 22 (1990).
110. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747. 949 (1982).
111. See Bose v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.. 466 U.S. 485. 504-05 (1984)
112. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.. 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cr. 1960).
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We come to this conclusion based on four sources of evidence, which we
discuss in succeeding subsections:
(1) Copyright decisions often do compare and contrast the facts in a case
with the facts in prior cases. Decisions that determine whether two items are
substantially similar in their expression-rather than just deciding whether such
a conclusion is clearly erroneous-are thus of significant precedential value.
(2) Lawyers likewise seem to rely somewhat on prior case law.
(3) The Supreme Court has accepted that independent review is valuable
even where, as here, the substantive rule is fact-intensive and the precedent-
building benefits of independent review are not likely to be very large. While
the Court may have erred on this-or perhaps even generally erred in Bose-
the Court's considered judgment in these cases deserves respect.
(4) While there may be some costs to independent review, some circuits
have adopted it (for reasons other than the ones we suggest) with no obvious
ill effects. Likewise, all circuits generally independently review fair use
findings, again with little trouble.
Points one and two suggest that independent review may be practically
beneficial. Point three suggests that even a small benefit may be adequate to
justify it. Point four suggests that independent review is unlikely to be harmful.
This evidence is tentative, and we are not sure how one could get more
definitive evidence. Still, given the Court's ruling in Bose, the burden of proof
should be on those who want to carve out a copyright exception. Absent such
a showing, fidelity to the rules requires that Bose be followed; independent
appellate review is therefore the sounder result.
1. Lower Courts' Use of Prior Cases as Benchmarks
Despite the supposedly ad hoc nature of each idea-expression decision,
courts do look to benchmark cases in deciding whether two works are
substantially similar in their expression. Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy
Corp.,"3 a case dealing with alleged infringement of copyrights in games,
dolls, and toys, is a good example. The Durham court acknowledged that
"'[g]ood eyes and common sense may be as useful as deep study of... cases,
which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts."' 4 But the court
went on to say: "[W]e have nevertheless consulted the cases dealing with toys
and dolls in order to check both our eyes and our sense."'" 5 Indeed, the court
cited eleven cases on similar subjects, briefly noting degrees of similarity. The
court acknowledged that the plaintiff's and defendant's dolls were similar in
that they walked or crawled, were small and made of plastic, and had "full
113. 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. Id. at 917 (quoting Couleur Int'l Ltd. v. Opulent Fabrics Inc., 330 F. Supp, 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1971)).
115. Id.
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faces, pert noses, bow lips, and large, widely spaced eyes,"'"16 but cited cases
holding that these sorts of combinations of features are standard doll features
and hence ideas, not expressions." 7
Likewise, Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc.' 8 relied on comparisons
with earlier case law in holding that He-Man (a Masters of the Universe
character) did not infringe the Conan the Barbarian character. Saban
Entertainment, Inc. v. 222 World Corp."9 similarly quoted extensively from
an earlier case in concluding that the Mega Rangers Power Bike set was
substantially similar in its expression to the Mighty Morphin Power Rangers
dolls.
Moving from toys to compilations, in Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown
Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc.,' ° the Second Circuit reversed a lower
court opinion and held that, while the plaintiff's "Chinese Business Guide &
Directory" was copyrightable, the defendant's "Chinese American-Life Guide"
did not copy the Business Guide's copyright-protected selection and
arrangement. Judge Winter noted that the Business Guide selected 9000
businesses and arranged them in 260 categories, while the Life Guide selected
only 2000 businesses and arranged them in twenty-eight categories.' The
selections and arrangements were not similar enough to constitute
infringement. The opinion drew on two earlier compilation cases, Eckes v.
Card Prices Update2 and Kregos v. Associated Press,"s as well as on the
Supreme Court's decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co.,'2 in deciding where to draw the line.
Collectively, Eckes, Kregos, and Key Publications show the Second Circuit
erecting fairly detailed guideposts to help draw the idea-expression line in
factual compilation cases. Selecting 5000 out of 18,000 baseball cards as being
of premium value is copyrightable expression.'" Choosing 9000 businesses
for a business guide and arranging them into categories is expression, but
creating another business guide with substantially different selections and
arrangements takes only the idea, not the expression.'2 Putting together nine
kinds of statistics on pitchers is just enough to qualify for protection, but that
protection is limited to near exact copying.' Together these cases give
116. Id. at 916.
117. See id.; cf Past Pluto Prods. Corp. v. Dana, 627 F. Supp. 1435 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (similarly relying
on several cases in determining copyrightability, as opposed to substantial similarity).
118. 712 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
119. 865 F. Supp. 1047 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
120. 945 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1991).
121. See id. at 515.
122. 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984).
123. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
124. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
125. See Eckes, 736 F.2d at 863.
126. See Key Publications, 945 F.2d at 515-16.
127. See Kregos, 937 F.2d at 702, 709-10.
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considerable guidance to how much protection a compilation will likely
receive.
Even with literary works, courts use previous cases as guides and
instruction (though this may at first glance seem harder, since literary works
are much more complex than compilations or toys). Consider Nash v. CBS,
Inc. 128 Jay Robert Nash published many books claiming that John Dillinger
was not actually killed in a shootout with FBI agents; instead, Nash's theory
went, a look-alike was shot in his place, and Dillinger laid low and survived
for many decades. An episode of the TV show Simon and Simon was based
on this idea, and Nash sued for copyright infringement. The district court
granted summary judgment for CBS, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
In his opinion, Judge Easterbrook pointed out that the existing tests for
distinguishing ideas from expression "do[] little to help resolve a given
case," 129 and observed that "[a]fter 200 years of wrestling with copyright
questions, it is unlikely that courts will come up with the answer any time
soon, if indeed there is 'an' answer, which we doubt."'' 30 Easterbrook
analyzed how providing either too little or too much protection might
discourage production of new works, then wrote that courts "must muddle
through, using not a fixed rule but a sense of the consequences of moving
dramatically in either direction."' 3' Despite these concerns, the Nash court
did look to earlier cases as benchmarks: It compared the fact pattern to that in
Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,32 which found no infringement
because there was substantial similarity only of facts and not of expression,
and to that in Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co. ,13 which found infringement
because the expression was substantially similar. The prior cases did create law
that gave some guidance in a future case.
Of course, these cases, and others like them,' 34 are hardly conclusive
proof that independent appellate review is worth the candle. Courts might just
be citing the precedents as post hoc rationalizations of whatever view they held
to begin with. Or perhaps the precedents do provide useful benchmarks-and
are therefore useful predictors-but only to a small degree; perhaps each new
precedent is helpful only in a few cases, and even then only to set a mood
rather than to provide a definite answer.
128. 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990).
129. Id. at 1540.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1541.
132. 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
133. 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
134. See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995) (engaging in an extensive
comparison with Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer California, 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991)); Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Honora Jewelry Co., 509 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1974) (drawing on Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1971)); Uneeda Doll Co. v. Regent Baby Prods. Corp.,
355 F. Supp. 438 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (drawing on Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir.
1966)).
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Nonetheless, the cases do undercut the strong claim that each copyright
case is sui generis. Judges at least assert that past decisions are helpful in
deciding future ones. Precedents do seem to "confine the perimeters"' 3 of
the idea-expression dichotomy, to "mark[] out the limits of the standard
through the process of case-by-case adjudication,"'36 to "give[] meaning" to
the rule "through the evolutionary process of common-law adjudication.""'
And the Court itself accepts the notion that litigation may help "the boundaries
of copyright law [to] be demarcated as clearly as possible."' 31
The magnitude of this clarifying effect is unclear. If Bose had never
existed, and if the Court were deciding solely on pragmatic grounds whether
to adopt independent appellate review in copyright cases, we might conclude
that the clarifying effect is too speculative to justify independent review. But
the Court has mandated independent review, because of both the supposed law-
clarifying benefits of such review and the perceived constitutional value of an
extra look in cases involving free speech rights. Given this, Bose must be
followed unless there is strong reason to believe that its reasoning is mistaken
in copyright cases. The cases we discuss in this subsection suggest that there
is no such strong reason.
2. Lawyers' Use of Prior Cases as Benchmarks
Another possible check on whether the Supreme Court's intuitions apply
to copyright cases is the view of experienced lawyers. Theory that sounds good
in the ivory tower, or to the Justices, may nevertheless end up failing on the
streets.
We are conscious of the great difficulty, perhaps even impossibility, of any
scientific empirical work in this area. Even if we could ask a large enough
sample of lawyers their views on the question, we would get only a general
sense of lawyers' beliefs (as filtered through the particular text of the questions
we asked). These beliefs might not quite match reality; they might not even
reveal the lawyers' likely actions; in fact, because many lawyers do not often
consciously think about standards of review, they may not have any settled
beliefs on the subject at all.
Nonetheless, we thought it worthwhile to talk to a handful of experienced
lawyers to get a sense of their views-a reality check against the judgment of
several expert practitioners. If, for instance, all of them had firmly told us that
prior case law was useless in predicting future cases, this would have led us
to think twice about our conclusions.
135. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States. Inc. 466 U.S 485. 502-04 (1984)
136. Id. at 503.
137. Id. at 502.
138. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)
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We asked six copyright lawyers how they advise clients whether one work
may have infringed another. 139 We started with general questions about how
the lawyers predict what a court would do if presented with a specific fact
pattern, and then focused on questions about appellate review.140 This is
obviously not a scientific survey of any sort-the sample size is laughably
small, and the questions are open-ended-but it may provide some insight into
how at least some lawyers react to cases.
When we asked the lawyers generally how they would predict what a court
would do-without specifically raising the possibility of comparing a case
against precedents14'-we got a range of answers. Some lawyers mentioned
case law, among other things. 42 Others initially stressed that it is a matter
of judgment. 4 3 Blaine Greenberg reported that he presents nonlawyers in his
office with the two items and asks for their reactions.
When asked explicitly whether they would look to prior cases,'" those
who didn't initially mention them split on their usefulness. Bob Osterberg
stated that he would turn to those cases he knows and do research on cases
outside his core field (music). Herb Schwartz reported that he would look to
cases, but "cases only take you so far in this area." Greenberg would look to
cases "only if we had a very specific area where I thought it had case law that
goes to it," stressing the fact-specific nature of the question.
The lawyers could think of few ways to make it easier to predict likely
results. 45 Schwartz remarked that "it's like pornography, unfortunately. '"'4 6
They split over whether having more benchmark cases would help.'47 Tom
Hemnes thought that benchmark cases help in more established media, but that
courts have trouble in more unusual areas. Greenberg said that "the more
139. Telephone Interview with Blaine Greenberg, Partner, Troop, Meisinger, Steuber and Pasich, Los
Angeles, Cal. (Apr. 10, 1997); Telephone Interview with Tom Hemnes, Partner, Foley, Hoag & Eliot,
Boston, Mass. (Apr. 21, 1997); Telephone Interview with David Nimmer, Of Counsel, Irell & Manella, Los
Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 5, 1997); Telephone Interview with Peter Nolan, Assistant General Counsel, Walt
Disney Company, Los Angeles, Cal. (Mar. 11, 1997); Telephone Interview with Bob Osterberg, Of
Counsel, Abelman, Frayne and Schwab, New York, N.Y. (Mar. 25, 1997); Telephone Interview with Herb
Schwartz, Partner, Fish & Neave, New York, N.Y. (Apr. 16, 1997). In the succeeding discussion, we
provide a reference only if it is unclear from the text to which interview we are referring.
140. For the full questionnaire, see infra Appendix.
141. See infra Appendix, Question 1.
142. Telephone Interview with Tom Hemnes, supra note 139; Telephone Interview with David
Nimmer, supra note 139; Telephone Interview with Peter Nolan, supra note 139.
143. Telephone Interview with Bob Osterberg, supra note 139; Telephone Interview with Herb
Schwartz, supra note 139.
144. See infra Appendix, Question 2.
145. See infra Appendix, Question 4. Greenberg had the interesting suggestion of a database that
would not only list appellate decisions by area, but would also provide side-by-side comparisons of the
material being litigated.
146. Schwartz's remark was an allusion to Justice Stewart's famous statement in Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring), that "I shall not today attempt further to define [hard.
core pornography]; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see
it . ..."
147. See infra Appendix, Question 5.
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information that exists and the more published opinions there are, the better off
you are. But the more cases decided, the more likely it is that you can find a
rationale for your argument because not all courts are going to agree." Peter
Nolan agreed that courts sometimes disagree and noted that benchmark cases
only help "if you have something very akin to your situation." Osterberg
thought more benchmarks might be useful in some areas, though he believed
that in his area (literary property) there were plenty. On the other hand,
Schwartz doubted that more benchmark cases would increase predictability.
David Nimmer, meanwhile, thought there were plenty of cases; indeed, he
said, "maybe it would make life easier if there were fewer benchmark cases."
These responses reflect, sometimes simultaneously, two conflicting views
on the accumulation of precedent. One view holds that the buildup of
precedent makes the law clearer, more detailed, and more predictable. The
other view sees case law becoming more chaotic, as courts with different
outlooks find ways to distinguish cases with close facts.
Most of the lawyers distinguished how they use district court and circuit
court precedents.148 This is partly because circuit cases are mandatory
precedent, but there are other reasons as well. Greenberg felt that district
courts were less predictable than circuit courts.'49 As for using cases from
the other circuits, the lawyers differed. Osterberg said that even cases from
other circuit courts "get more attention and respect" than do district court
cases. Nolan had a similar opinion, noting that, among other things, circuit
cases involve three judges, thereby pooling the accumulated legal experience
and wisdom of more people. Nimmer and Schwartz were less inclined to pay
attention to cases from other circuits.
When asked whether they treat circuit court cases reviewing summary
judgments differently from those reviewing the results of trials,' the
lawyers gave varying answers. Nimmer said he treats them differently "only
to predict if this is a case that's right for summary judgment." Greenberg
agreed, saying that if a case survives summary judgment and gets to trial,
"then I would advise the client that I think the equitable appeal of the case will
be a stronger determinant than the case law." Schwartz endorsed a view closer
to ours, saying "denials of summary judgment don't tell you a lot. Granting
summary judgment is a pretty extreme case. So trials tell you more."
On the points most closely tied to this Essay, most of the lawyers do not
pay attention to whether circuit court cases used de novo review or clear error
148. See infra Appendix, Question 6.
149. As he put it, "Trial judges are such strong personalities that they don't care what their brethren
will do. It wouldn't surprise me if some cases would go ten different ways depending on who you
draw.... But if the case can go to the Ninth Circuit, and if the circuit is consistent. I may anticipate
winning at the appellate level."
150. See infra Appendix, Question 7.
1998] 2457
The Yale Law Journal
review. 5' Hemnes, however, said that "if the court holds a decision is not
clearly erroneous but has dicta saying it is questionable and it might hold
differently under a different posture, then I treat clear error cases differently.
Usually the court will make that clear." And Osterberg did say that he "would
tend to give greater weight to decisions using de novo review." When asked
whether they were aware of differences among circuits in the standard of
review, 52 a few had some sense of differences, but none had any detailed
awareness. When asked about general differences among circuits, 53 Hemnes
said the following:
[T]he circuits that address this comparatively infrequently are harder
to predict than those which have a long track record. At the most
extreme, the Second Circuit is pretty predictable.... On the other
hand, the Ninth Circuit is a puzzle to me. You'd think they would
have a lot of experience, but they are less predictable to me. It may
be that they are struggling with less traditional media.
Some of the lawyers did think that the standard of review a court employs
might affect their decision whether or not to appeal a trial court's holding."
De novo review should make losing parties more likely to appeal.' 5 Not all,
however, thought the standard of review would affect their decision whether
to appeal.'56
Our informal inquiry therefore suggests that these practicing lawyers have
not particularly considered the effects of appellate review standards on
copyright litigation, the issue on which we focus in this Essay. Some of them
share the view that copyright cases are quite fact-specific and that good
judgment rather than specific case law is a lawyer's most important guide. But
at least a few of them think that more benchmark cases, particularly on close
fact patterns, would make outcomes more predictable. Moreover, the lawyers
generally agree that circuit court opinions are more useful than trial court
opinions. The judgments of these expert practitioners thus reinforce our view
that devices that force circuit courts to produce more detailed, useful opinions
could be of some help. De novo appellate review is one such device.
151. See infra Appendix, Question 8.
152. See infra Appendix, Question 11.
153. See infra Appendix, Question 10.
154. See infra Appendix, Question 9.
155. Greenberg, for example, said that "if there is de novo review, you've got a much better chance
of winning. If there is de novo review, we'd be more likely to appeal, and more likely to be interested in
what the court of appeals had done on these cases." Nimmer said he "should be" influenced by the standard
of review: "If the standard is de novo, and I think it's a good case for my client, I should appeal. If it is
clear error and the judge preserved the record, then I'm sunk."
156. Schwartz denied that the standard of review would have an effect. Nolan said that "if it were de
novo I'm more likely to go up. But unless a pile of money is involved we would not appeal, we would
settle. It's too costly to appeal." He said he uses appeals mainly to establish legal principles.
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3. The Supreme Court's Views in Other Areas
Case law and interviews with lawyers thus suggest that extra precedents
may be of some, albeit limited, value. Is this limited benefit sufficient to
justify independent review? The Supreme Court has recently confronted this
question in other constitutional contexts, and has generally come down in favor
of independent review even when the law-clarifying benefits of such review
are modest.
The most recent case, Ornelas v. United States, 57 involved review of
reasonable suspicion and probable cause conclusions in Fourth Amendment
cases. These are fact-intensive, totality-of-the-circumstances inquiries, and the
Court began by stressing the complexity of the issues involved:
Articulating precisely what "reasonable suspicion" and "probable
cause" mean is not possible. They are commonsense, non-technical
conceptions that deal with "'the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act."' As such, the standards are "not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." ... They are ... fluid
concepts that take their substantive content from the particular
contexts in which the standards are being assessed.'58
Despite this, the Court held that independent appellate review was required:
[T]he legal rules for probable cause and reasonable suspicion acquire
content only through application. Independent review is therefore
necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to
clarify[,J the legal principles.... [W]here the "relevant legal principle
can be given meaning only through its application to the particular
circumstances of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the trier
of fact's conclusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a
federal appellate court of its primary function as an expositor of
law" .....
Finally, de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come
closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined "'set of
rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct
determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement."' . . . "IT]he law
declaration aspect of independent review potentially may guide police,
unify precedent, and stabilize the law .... "
It is true that because the mosaic which is analyzed for a
reasonable-suspicion or probable-cause inquiry is multi-faceted, "one
determination will seldom be a useful 'precedent' for another." But
there are exceptions .... And even where one case may not squarely
157. 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996).
158. Id. at 1661 (citations omitted).
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control another one, the two decisions when viewed together may
usefully add to the body of law on the subject. 59
The Court took a similar approach in Thompson v. Keohane,160 where
it confronted the proper standard of review on habeas corpus of state court
determinations regarding whether a person was "in custody" for Miranda v.
Arizona'6' purposes. The Thompson Court acknowledged that the inquiry had
a "'totality of the circumstances' cast,' ' t62 and that appellate decisions might
not be able to "supply 'a definite rule. '"1 63 It concluded, however, that "'in
custody' determinations do guide future decisions"; 6 that though such
determinations cannot create definite rules, "they nonetheless can reduce the
area of uncertainty"; 65 and that they may "unify precedent[] and stabilize the
law.' 16
6
When no constitutional values are at stake,' 67 or when the application of
a test is generally interwoven with witness credibility determinations"' -
usually not the case in idea-expression judgments, which often require only the
comparison of physical items' 69-deferential review may be proper. But as
Ornelas and Thompson suggest, where constitutional principles presumptively
require independent judgment review, courts should not be deterred by the fact





159. Id. at 1662-63 (citations omitted).
160. 516 U.S. 99 (1995).
161. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
162. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112 n.ll.
163. Id. at 113 n.13.
164. Id. at 114.
165. Id. at 113 n.13.
166. Id. at 115.
167. See, for example, Cooler & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), which dealt with the
question of whether a lawyer engaged in reasonable investigation for purposes of Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; and Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), which dealt with whether the
government's position in litigation was substantially justified for purposes of determining Equal Access to
Justice Act fee awards. In both cases, the Court held that deferential review was required because the fact
patterns involved "'multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly resist generalization"' and that
independent appellate review could not "clarify the underlying principles of law." Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S.
at 404-05 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560-62 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1965))).
Unfortunately, the Court has not explained exactly why it treated Ornelas and Thompson differently from
Cooter & Gell and Pierce; the best explanation seems to be that the latter cases involved nonconstitutional
matters that were peripheral to the merits.
168. See Miller, 474 U.S. at 114, 116-17 (citing cases that mandate deferential review in certain habeas
corpus contexts).
169. Of course, decisions about whether the defendant used the plaintiff's work or whether the
defendant's work is an entirely independent creation often turn on credibility judgments. This, however,
is an analytically separate inquiry from the decision whether a plaintiff's expression is substantially similar
to a defendant's expression.
170. Ornelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
232 (1983)).
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4. Independent Appellate Review in Those Circuits That
Already Practice It
The Second Circuit already independently reviews findings of substantial
similarity of expression,'71 and there is little sign of this causing any great
problems. We know of no commentary or cases pointing to specific bad results
of such review, or even generally bemoaning its presence. In fact, our tentative
impression is that the Second Circuit has on the whole produced a more
helpful body of case law than the other big copyright circuit, the Ninth. 172
This is only a tentative impression, and even if it is correct, there may be other
explanations: The Ninth Circuit has more judges and may thus produce less
consistent case law, and the West Coast seems to have more cutting-edge new
media cases, which might make it harder to create clear, settled precedent.
Nonetheless, so long as the Second Circuit does no worse than the Ninth, the
main argument against following Bose-that the practical costs are so great
that we should carve out an exception to the Court's pronouncement-falls
away.
Moreover, all circuits are already familiar with independent appellate
review in at least one area of copyright law: fair use. 173 Fair use, like
substantial similarity of expression, has generally been seen as extremely fact-
intensive, "requir[ing] a difficult case-by-case balancing of complex
factors."' 74 Despite this, however, appellate decisions have created some
greater predictability. In the words of Justice Kennedy, "The common-law
method instated by the fair use provision of the copyright statute . . . presumes
that rules will emerge from the course of decisions,"'175 and it seems that they
171. See Concord Fabrics, Inc, v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 1969).
172. Compare, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1984) (providing, in a factual
compilation case, fairly detailed guidance on drawing the idea-expression line), discussed supra text
accompanying notes 122-127, and Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Pub'g Enters., 945 F.2d 509
(2d Cir. 1991) (same), discussed supra text accompanying notes 120-127, with Landsberg v. Scrabble
Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485 (9th Cir 1984) (providing much less guidance on the idea-
expression line), Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985)
(same), and Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1985) (same). In
addition, contrast Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980), which goes through
a rather detailed and reasoned comparison of the cases, with Williams v. Kaag Manufacturers, Inc., 338
F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1964), which concludes only that "an ordinary reasonable person, here represented in
the person of the trial judge," found a lack of substantial similarity in deferring to the lower court's finding
under a clear error standard.
173. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); New Era
Publications v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1990); Triangle Publications, Inc. v.
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980); Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,
972 F.2d 1429, 1434 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Sega Enters. Ltd. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th
Cir. 1984).
174. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1255 (2d Cir. 1986); see also Triangle
Publications, 626 F.2d at 1174.
175. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 596 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
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have. Following Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,176 we know that
certain sorts of private noncommercial copying of entire works are generally
permissible. Following Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,177 we know that
parodies commenting on the works from which they borrow are favored uses
akin to commentary or news reporting. Other cases refine the test further.
"[T]he evolutionary process of common-law adjudication" 78 seems to work
for fair use, which leads us to suspect that it might also work (or at least not
cause enough harm to justify disregarding Bose) for substantial similarity of
expression.
C. Against Special Pleading for Copyright
We thus see no compelling normative reason to treat copyright differently
from other speech restrictions, restrictions that are likewise substantively valid,
but nonetheless require certain procedural safeguards. There is some practical
reason to be skeptical of Bose's utility, but the arguments against applying
Bose aren't enough to avoid its precedential force.
And we see good reason not to treat copyright more favorably than other
speech restrictions. The First Amendment demands sacrifices from many who
earnestly believe in the legitimacy of their favorite speech restrictions. This
burden is always heavy, but it seems heavier still when others' speech
restrictions-especially restrictions that, like copyright law, are identified with
the relatively rich and powerful-are given a free ride.'79 Partisans of hate
speech restrictions have already begun to point this out; 8 1 while we disagree
with their substantive proposals, they are right to demand that people who
176. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
177. 510 U.S. 569 (1994); see also Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F3d 109, 112-17 (2d
Cir. 1998) (comparing and contrasting facts with the facts of Campbell).
178. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 502 (1984).
179. Cf Martin E. Lee, Free Speech in Moral Joust with Hate Speech, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 4,
1996, at 17, 17 (reviewing THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA
AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995)) ("Noting routine exceptions to free
speech absolutism (copyright, trademark and such) that hew to business interests, the essays cite studies
that document the heavy toll inflicted by the multibillion dollar pom industry, as it profits from a kind of
hate speech that degrades women and children .... This book provides a sober rejoinder to clichd-ridden
thinking by highlighting the profound power imbalance and social inequities that dim the luster of the First
Amendment.").
180. See, e.g., Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Ten Arguments Against Hate-Speech Regulation:
How Valid?, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 475, 484 (1996) ("Powerful actors like government agencies, the writers'
lobby, industries, and so on have always been successful at coining free speech 'exceptions' to suit their
interest-copyright, false advertising, words of threat, defamation, libel, plagiarism, words of monopoly,
and many others. But the strength of the interest behind these exceptions seems no less than that of a black
undergraduate subjected to vicious abuse while walking late at night on campus."); Richard Delgado &
David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of Paternalistic Objections to Hate
Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 892 (1994) ("Perhaps... in twenty or fifty years we will look
upon hate speech rules with the same equanimity with which we now view defamation, forgery, obscenity,
copyright, and dozens of other exceptions to the free speech principle, and wonder why in the late twentieth
century we resisted them so strongly.").
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oppose suggested new exceptions to the First Amendment defend their support
for the old exceptions.
Any special preference for copyright law must thus be justified by some
substantial difference between copyright and other speech restrictions. Where,
as here, no such difference exists, favoritism for a particular kind of speech
restriction risks corroding public respect for First Amendment law more
generally. And, ironically, publishers and producers-the very people who
often benefit from the way copyright law now ignores First Amendment
protections-have the most to lose from any corrosion of First Amendment
protection outside copyright. 1Si
Ill. RECONSIDERING BosE?
Thus, Bose constitutionally requires independent judgment review of idea-
expression conclusions. There is simply no good justification for carving out
a special exception for copyright cases. And yet, we suspect that quite a few
readers, especially copyright lawyers, may still conclude that the majority of
circuits is right and that independent review is wrong. Independent review
would impose a burden, both on litigants and the appellate system: It would
require appellate courts to spend more time on each appeal t12 and might
encourage more litigants to appeal,'83 thus delaying final decisions and
consuming more court time and litigant money. In contrast, the benefits that
independent review would provide seem somewhat speculative.
These arguments, however, would apply not just to independent review in
copyright cases, but to the Bose rule generally, which makes this a good
opportunity to ask whether Bose might be mistaken. We won't engage in a
complete analysis here, but we will briefly sketch how such an argument might
go and what it would mean for First Amendment law more broadly.
Any system of justice administered by humans has imperfections.
Factfinders might be biased or simply wrong. Rules will not be perfectly well
defined, which increases the risk of factfinder bias in applying the rules and
leads cautious people to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone."'"
181. We are indebted to Doug Laycock for this point.
182. See United States v. McConney, 728 F2d 1195, 1201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (-It can
hardly be disputed that application of a non-deferential standard of review requires a greater investment
of appellate resources than does application of the clearly erroneous standard. Appellate courts could do
their work more quickly if they applied the clearly erroneous standard in most circumstances. because the
courts then need only determine if the lower court's decision is a reasonable one, not substitute their own
judgment for that of the trial judge.").
183. We suspect that plaintiffs and defendants will differ more tn thetr estimates of success under
independent review than in their estimates of success under deferential revtew. If this is so, then settlement
will be less likely. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note to 1985 amendments (stating that
independent appellate review "tend[s] to ... multiply appeals by encouraging appellate retral of some
factual issues").
184. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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Normal, nonconstitutional law reacts with some equanimity to these
imperfections. Sure, judges and juries sometimes get matters wrong, but that's
life. Sure, the law is vague, but we can't demand perfect clarity in our
complex world. Perhaps the vagueness creates something of a chilling effect,
but that effect is unavoidable, tolerable, and not really too great; people are,
after all, used to uncertainty and risk, and they are unlikely to overreact to it.
Life is uncertain, and the law, to use a phrase one of us has often heard from
his father, "is as vague as life itself."' We might as well deal with it.
One could easily imagine a constitutional jurisprudence that imposed some
substantive restraints-for instance, a requirement that libel law allow truth as
a defense,' 86 or even a requirement that public figures suing over statements
of public concern prove "actual malice"' 87 -but then left the law largely
alone. Such a system wouldn't trouble itself over independent review; mistakes
happen, rules are vague, but that's just too bad. Nor would such a system put
restrictions on preliminary injunctions, quanta of proof, burdens of proof, or
what have you.
This approach appears in some of Justice White's libel opinions. White
consistently endorsed New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'88 but he was
skeptical of further constitutionalizing libel law. He was, for instance,
unpersuaded that strict liability for falsehoods about private citizens was a
"realistic threat to the press and its service to the public."' 89 This risk was,
to him, subordinate to the normal tort law principle of compensating innocent
victims for the deliberate, even if honestly mistaken, actions of a
publisher.' 90 He did not "fear[] uncontrolled awards of damages by juries"
because of his confidence in "the good sense of most jurors" and in the (quite
limited) nonconstitutional appellate review mechanisms that would set aside
obviously unreasonable verdicts.' 9' As to independent review, Justice White
largely joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bose, which suggested, among
other things, that "the need to shield protected speech from the risk of
erroneous fact-finding" does not require independent review of certain
issues. 92
The alternative to this view is the "pervasive constitutional concern"
approach: a mistrust of the normal-law system and a concern that its
185. Frequent communication from Vladimir Volokh to Eugene Volokh.
186. Cf., e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1821) ("In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous
is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted .....
187. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
188. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
189. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
190. See id.
191. Id. at 394 & n.31.
192. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 519 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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imperfections are intolerable in the First Amendment context. Under this view,
the risk of factfinder errors, as errors of constitutional dimension, necessitates
extra review procedures. The risk of constitutional violations must be
minimized, even at the expense of increasing the risk of uncompensated harm.
The chilling effects of substantial liability and of vague laws are presumed,
even without empirical evidence of their magnitude. Constitutional freedoms
are seen as "fragile"'93 and in need of special procedural protection;
"rigorous procedural safeguards" are needed because "the freedoms of
expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks."''
The tension between these views is clearly visible in First Amendment
jurisprudence, especially libel jurisprudence. It is likewise visible in other
areas, such as the death penalty case law, where the Court, not content with
just deciding whether the death penalty is substantively constitutional, has
concluded that the danger of normal law's imperfections is so great as to
justify additional procedural requirements.'95
The Bose rule rejects the normal-law model. Under most circumstances,
Bose acknowledges, Rule 52(a) requires deference to lower courts (at least as
to pure questions of fact),196 and the Seventh Amendment requires similar
deference to juries; 197 but where constitutional liberties are involved, the rule
must be different.198 The judgment behind this is partly empirical-courts of
appeals will correct factfinder mistakes and refine vague rules through case-by-
case adjudication-but primarily normative: Courts of appeals have a
constitutional duty to try to correct factfinder mistakes and to try to refine
vague rules. The normative value of such attempts at correction and
refinement, even if they aren't always practically very helpful, justifies the
tangible costs to the judicial system and the litigants.
The Court's arguments for adopting the pervasive constitutional concern
model strike us as persuasive. Writers who ask, "What may I lawfully write?"
193. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977) ("First Amendment interests are fragile interests.
and a person who contemplates protected activity might be discouraged by the in terrorem effect of the
statute."); see also, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415. 433 (1963) ("These freedoms are delicate and
vulnerable .... The threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application
of sanctions.").
194. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963). quoted in IV/PBS. Inc. v. City of
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215. 230 (1990), Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad. 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975). and
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971).
Another alternative, proposed by Professor Monaghan, is for courts to use independent review until
they believe they have refined the test as much as they can and then shift to reviewing only for clear error.
See Monaghan, supra note 29, at 275-76. We are not sure this approach will ultimately work, because it's
hard for courts to tell when enough is enough. The standard of review will essentially be up in the air for
a long time, with the appellant in each case insisting that there is more refinement possible and thus asking
for de novo review, and the appellee arguing that it is now time to switch to clear error review. Still, we
agree with Professor Monaghan that Bose might bear some reexamination.
195. See. e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).
196. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
197. See Bose, 466 U.S. at 508 n.27.
198. See id.
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deserve a clearer and better policed standard than manufacturers who ask,
"What safety devices does the duty of 'reasonableness' require me to
implement?"199 Free speech, as a constitutional right, deserves special
protection.
Nevertheless, we confess that the experience of copyright law tests those
arguments. Copyright law has led a largely normal-law existence,
unencumbered with the various procedures the Court has demanded in libel
cases, but the sky has not fallen. There might be a chilling effect here and
there, with some people steering "far wider of the unlawful zone"2" than
they otherwise would have and the occasional (or even frequent) unjust verdict,
but writers keep writing, and the marketplace of ideas doesn't seem strikingly
impoverished. As Part II explains, we believe that none of this justifies treating
copyright law differently from other restrictions. Still, it does provoke some
skepticism about the Court's insistence on the pervasive constitutional concern
model in free speech cases generally.
One purpose of our Essay has been to show that if one believes that
independent review ought not be required in copyright cases, the only
principled way to avoid this requirement, is to reconsider it on a general basis.
If the Court has indeed gone too far in its distrust of the normal-law
adjudication process, all those harmed by speech-whether speech that
infringes on a copyright, speech that unjustifiably defames, or speech that
counsels violence-should be entitled to the benefits of any retrenchment that
might be proper.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Finally, we also hope to lead people to think more generally about "First
Amendment due process" in copyright cases. Harper & Row upheld copyright
law substantively, but that itself tells us little: Libel law, for instance, is also
substantively constitutional, but the Court has imposed many procedural
requirements for libel cases. While these need not necessarily apply equally to
all other speech restrictions, one can credibly argue that they should be so
applied. With that in mind, we suggest the following several areas for future
research-and litigation.
A. Prior Restraint
Temporary restrictions on speech jus tified merely by the possibility that
the speech might be unprotected-as opposed to a judicial finding that the
199. Perhaps the manufacturers also deserve clearer guidelines than the law currently provides;
nonetheless, while a considerable amount of uncertainty might have to be tolerated for the manufacturers,
less should be tolerated for speakers.
200. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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speech is unprotected-are generally considered unconstitutional prior
restraints.20 Are preliminary injunctions in copyright cases, which can be
based merely on a finding of likelihood of success on the merits, similarly
unconstitutional? 20 2 If not, what does this tell us about the propriety of
similar preliminary injunctions in libel cases and other cases where important
private rights may be jeopardized by continued misbehavior pending final
judgment?20 3
B. Strict Liability
Laws that impose strict liability for certain kinds of speech have generally
been struck down because they would lead to too much self-censorship on the
part of cautious speakers and distributors. Thus, even private figure plaintiffs
in public concern libel cases must prove at least that the defendant was
negligent;2 similarly, in obscenity cases the government must prove that the
defendant knew or should have known the content of the material he was
distributing, 2 5 and reasonable mistake as to the age of a subject is a defense
in child pornography cases. 206 Is copyright law's imposition of strict liability
for infringement thus wholly or partly unconstitutional?2"
C. Punitive and Presumed Damages
In public concern libel cases, punitive damages and presumed damages
may only be awarded against defendants who told falsehoods knowingly or
recklessly.208 In copyright cases, though, statutory damages-which are the
rough equivalent of libel's presumed (and perhaps even punitive) damages-
201. See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308. 316-17 (1980)
202. See id. (suggesting that the answer to this is -yes." at least for preliminary injunctions in general)
203. Cf. Mark Lemley & Eugene Volokh. Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in hItellectual Property
Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 1998) (arguing that preliminary injunctions in copynght cases are
often, but not always, unconstitutional).
204. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). Strict liability might be available in
private concern libel cases, though that question is unsettled. See Eugene Volokh. Freedom of Speech in
Cyberspace from the Listener's Perspective, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 377. 402,
205. See Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (ci'il cases); Smith v. California. 361 U.S
147 (1959) (criminal cases).
206. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982). Of course, some statutes allow any mistake
as a defense, even an unreasonable one. See, e.g.. United States v. X-Citement Video. Inc.. 513 US. 64
(1994) (interpreting the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act. 18 U S C § 2252 (1988
ed. & Supp. V)). It is unclear, though, whether any mens rea beyond negligence is constitutionally required.
207. Cf. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand. J.. dissenting) (arguing that
holding a magazine publisher strictly liable for infringement by a contributing author "is likely to prove
an appreciable and very undesirable burden upon the freedom of the press"). Edward. M Di Cato. Operator
Liability Associated with Maintaining a Computer Bulletin Board, 4 SOF'WARE L. 147. 155-56 (1990)
(discussing this question); Eugene Volokh. Cheap Speech and Vhat It Will Do. 104 YALE LJ 1805, 1844
n.130 (1995) (briefly touching on this question).
208. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348-50.
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may be awarded even against negligent or innocent defendants." 9 Is this
unconstitutional? Does the cap of $20,000 per work infringed t° save the law
from unconstitutionality? If so, does this suggest that similarly modest
presumed damages in libel cases should be allowed even without a finding of
"actual malice"?
D. Burden of Proof
In public concern libel cases, the Court has on constitutional grounds
required that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving falsehood, though under
the common law the defendant had the burden of proving truth.2"' Harper
& Row strongly suggested that speech constituting fair use, like speech that is
defamatory but true, is constitutionally protected.2"2 Does it follow that the
burden of proving unfair use must likewise be put on the plaintiff?2"3
E. Quantum of Proof
In public figure libel cases, the plaintiff must prove actual malice by clear
and convincing evidence, not just by a preponderance of the evidence.2"4
Some lower courts impose a similar standard for proof of obscenity in civil
obscenity injunction cases.2"5 Should such a standard be required for proof
of substantial similarity of expression, or of unfair use?2" 6
F. Vagueness and Jury Instructions
Independent appellate review, as we have argued, may make clearer
copyright law's otherwise vague dividing lines. In particular, independent
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(2), (c) (1994). Statutory damages are conventionally seen more as
presumed damages than punitive, but some cases suggest that they also have a punitive component. See,
e.g., Cass County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc., 88 F.3d 635, 643 (8th Cir 1996) (stating that "it is plain
that another role has emerged for statutory damages in copyright infringement cases: that of a punitive
sanction on infringers" akin to "the award of punitive damages"); Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
Software, 793 F2d 889, 897 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Under copyright law, punitive damages could come from
an award of statutory damages for willful infringement."); Video Cafe, Inc. v. De Tal, 961 F. Supp. 23,
26 (D.P.R. 1997) ("The Court would also note that statutory damages awards under § 504(c) serve both
compensatory and punitive purposes.").
210. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
211. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775-77 (1986).
212. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (describing "the
latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use" as a "First Amendment
protection[]").
213. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (holding, without considering
the First Amendment, that fair use is an affirmative defense and that the burden of proving it is on the
defendant).
214. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
215. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell Brothers' Santa Ana Theater, 180 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (Ct. App.
1982).
216. See Yen, supra note 36, at 434-35 (raising this question in passing).
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appellate review of fair use determinations has produced some principles that
are clearer than the otherwise fairly indefinite standard set forth in 17 U.S.C.
§ 107.217 Unfortunately, jury instructions sometimes fail to incorporate these
clarifying principles. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Model Jury Instructions
say the following:
Defendant contends that defendant made fair use of the copyrighted
work for the purpose of (criticism,) (comment,) (news reporting,)
(teaching,) (scholarship,) (research,) (other). The defendant has the
burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
In determining whether the use made of the work was fair, you shall
consider the following factors:
1. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
2. the nature of the copyrighted work;
3. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole;
4. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work; and
5. any other factors that bear upon the issue of fair use.21'
Nothing in these instructions captures the gloss placed on these factors by the
case law. For example, the instructions nowhere mention the principle that the
power of a parody or a review to "impair the market for [the work] by the
very effectiveness of its critical commentary" should be ignored under the
fourth factor;219 or that the second factor generally deserves little weight in
parody cases;220 or that it is permissible for a parody to use even "the
original's 'heart,"' so long as the parody then "depart[s] markedly" from this
heart.22' Nor do the instructions give juries any sense for how the factors
must be weighed, a sense that judges can get by comparing and contrasting the
relative weight of the factors against factors present in previously decided
cases. Finally, the fifth factor seems to invite the jury to apply its entirely
unguided discretion, perhaps even considering factors-such as the ideology
expressed in defendant's work-that it would be unconstitutional to
consider.22
217. See supra text accompanying notes 173-178.
218. MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRIcT COURTS OF THE NINH
CIRCUIT § 17.4.1 (1997).
219. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569. 593 (1994).
220. See id. at 586.
221. Id. at 588-89.
222. Cf Grayned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104. 108-09 (1972) (condemning vague laws for
"impermissibly delegat[ing] basic policy matters to ... juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application"); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania. 382
U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (holding that rules that are "so vague and standardless that (they] lave[] ...
jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards. what is prohibited and what is not in each
particular case," even when all that's at stake is a money judgment, violate due process).
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Juries given these instructions may decide cases entirely differently than
judges, who are familiar with the precedents. The fair use doctrine, the
Supreme Court tells us, is a "First Amendment protection[], 223 so the
principles developed in the fair use cases are of constitutional significance; but
the jury can't apply these principles if it doesn't hear about them. 224
Courts should, of course, use the model instructions only as starting points,
and then add custom instructions that embody whatever principles are relevant
to the particular fact pattern. But we're afraid that, in many instances, courts
may just stick with the model instructions.2z Circuits may want to consider
creating more detailed instructions, or at least instructions that specifically
direct trial courts to add appropriate details. At the very least, circuits should
probably discourage instructions containing entirely subjective factors such as
the fifth factor in the instruction above.
The answer to all these questions may be that copyright is different, and
that all First Amendment bets are therefore off. But we doubt that this is so,
and we believe that the issues are certainly contestable enough to merit further
investigation and assertion by lawyers.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Bose reasoning is right-and we think it probably is-then
independent appellate review should help make copyright law somewhat
clearer and more predictable. The "substantial similarity" test cries out for the
elaboration that independent appellate review is generally thought to provide.
We cannot promise dramatic improvements, but we think that, where speech
restrictions are concerned, even modest clarification will help.
In any event, whether or not the Bose reasoning is right (and we agree that
the matter is not free from doubt), Bose is the law, and we see no good
justification for courts to ignore Bose's command in the copyright context.226
Copyright law may be a permissible speech restriction, but it cannot claim a
categorical exemption from all free speech concerns. The same First
Amendment due process rules that apply to other substantively valid
restrictions must, absent a very good reason, apply equally to copyright.
223. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
224. Cf Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 122-24 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that
a rule was unconstitutionally vague, despite clarifying and narrowing constructions developed by appellate
courts, when the jury instructions were based on the vague statutory language rather than on the clarifying
construction); id. at 112-13 (majority opinion) (seeming to take a similar view); Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (holding that, in the Eighth Amendment context, where the vagueness doctrine is as
toothy as in the free speech context, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets
of the sentencing process," and stating that "ilt is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of [a
test] that is unconstitutionally vague on its face").
225. This is just our suspicion. We hope that others will investigate the matter more fully.
226. Stare decisis does not prevent courts from adopting this approach, even if in the past they have
reviewed substantial similarity findings only for clear error. See supra Section I.F.
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APPENDIX: PRACTrIONER SURVEY-'
Say a client comes to you and says he wants to publish something, but he's afraid of a copyright
lawsuit. It might be a book or a song or a movie or a factual compilation. He knows he's been
influenced by a preexisting work; he thinks he's only taken the idea, but he doesn't know how a court
would see things.
1. How do you decide whether he's borrowed only the idea or the expression1 How do you predict
what a court would do if it came to court?
2. If the subject does not mention cases: Do you also look at the cases and compare your situation
against cases that have found substantial similarity and cases that haven't found it"
3. If the subject answers no: How do you give a relatively precise answer*)
4. What, if anything, do you think might be done to make it easier for you to decide what's likely
an infringement and what isn't?
5. Do you think it would be easier for you to predict how courts will behave if there were more
benchmark cases against which to compare your situation)
6. In using past cases to predict results, do you distinguish between how you use circuit and district
court cases? If so, how?
7. In using past cases to predict results, do you distinguish circuit court cases reviewing sunmmary
judgments from circuit court cases reviewing the results of trials?
8. In using past cases to predict results, do you distinguish circuit court cases that have reached a
decision using de novo review from cases that have reached a decision using clear error review1
9. Say that, in a bench trial, the judge concludes that your client's work was substantially similar to
the plaintiff's. Would your decision about whether to appeal be influenced by the standard of
review on appeal (de novo as opposed to clear error) "
10. Have you noticed any differences among circuits in the way they deal with cases" If the subject
answers yes: What differences?
11. Are you aware of different standards of review-reviewing findings of substantial similarity de
novo as opposed to for clear error-among circuits1 If the subject annsers ses- Do the different
standards of review affect the overall case law1
227. For results of this survey, see supra Subsection II.B.2.

